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Abstract
Location based services (LBS) are one of the most
promising and innovative directions of convergence tech-
nologies resulting of emergence of several fields including
database systems, mobile communication, Internet technol-
ogy, and positioning systems. Although being initiated as
early as middle of 1990’s, it is only recently that the LBS
received a systematic profound research interest due to its
commercial and technological impact. As the LBS is related
to the user’s location which can be used to trace the user’s
activities, a strong privacy concern has been raised. To
preserve the user’s location, several intelligent works have
been introduced though many challenges are still awaiting
solutions. This paper introduces a survey on LBS systems
considering both localization technologies, model and ar-
chitectures guaranteeing privacy. We also overview crypto-
graphic primitive to possibly use in preserving LBS’s pri-
vacy followed by fruitful research directions basically con-
cerned with the privacy issue.
1. Introduction
The location based services (LBS) are convergence of
different technologies resulting of the recent development
of the mobile communication and computing, Internet tech-
nology, geographical information systems (GIS) [47], spa-
tial database systems, and others. Though the LBS as a
technological direction was initially innovated at the end of
the last century, it is only a few years ago that it received
a strong interest of research due to its applications that
promise a huge commercial impact in the major technology
consuming and producing regions in the world. For exam-
ple, according to ZDnet [51], the market size of LBS in Eu-
rope will grow to 622 million e in 2010 with an annual in-
crement of 34% from 2006 and the users to grow to 315 mil-
lion from the current 12 million users all around the world
for the same period. In Asia, according to INDOORLBS [22],
the market size as of 2006 was 291.7 million US dollars and
will be growing at the end of 2009 to count for 447 millions
with an annual growth of 15.3% where Japan and Korea
share 92% of the market size due to their assisting IT infras-
tructure. The applications of LBS systems include different
services with ranging profit fields. To mention some exam-
ple, recent LBS applications include location-based traffic
report, store finder, and advertisement, among others. In
the following we discuss the main scenarios and architec-
tural view of these applications.
The basic scenario of the LBS assumes the existence
of three distinct entities which are the LBS server or LBS
provider, the mobile operator, and the mobile user. The flow
of the LBS, as shown in Figure 1, goes as follow: first the
mobile user request the LBS server to provide him or her the
available specific set of services within his/her location’s
area and directions to get into them. Upon that, the LBS
server contact the concerned mobile provider to retrieve the
user’s location. The mobile provider, using of the location
technologies that will mentioned later, determines the user’s
location and send it back to LBS server which make a query
listing the available service within the user’s location and
send it back to the user. More details and the flow of other
technique is shown in section 2.
Obviously, to be able to provide the specific set of ser-
vices for the user within a reasonably accessible range from
the user’s current location, the user’s location is needed
by the LBS server. However, providing the exact loca-
tion would breach the users privacy. Accordingly, several
mechanisms are systematically studied in order to provide
both service and privacy to the user in the LBS system.
These mechanisms are classified according to the rule of
the user and underlying technique for hiding the users lo-
cation. Architecturally, the mechanisms guaranteeing pri-
vacy are classified according to the users role into: non-
cooperative mechanisms, centralized trust third party mech-
anisms, and peer-to-peer cooperative mechanisms. Accord-
ing to underlaying technique for hiding the user’s location,
these mechanisms are classified into cryptographic and non-
cryptographic techniques. More details on these techniques
will be shown later in this article.
This paper introduces a survey on the LBS systems
demonstrating the used technologies and techniques and de-
tailing cryptographic primitives to be used in order to pro-
vide a favorable privacy. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows: 2 introduces the localization techniques used
in LBS systems, section 3 introduces the issues of the pri-
vacy in LBS systems considering architectures and R&D
projects, section 4 surveys main cryptographic primitives,
section 5 introduces directions for further research and sec-
tion 6 draws concluding remarks.
2. Localization techniques
Localization techniques are classified in a high level and
low level categories. This sections review the classification
2.1. High level classification
High level classification considers the rule of the user
where the techniques are into three parts which care
networks-based, handset-based and hybrid locations. The
network-based localization uses existing infrastructure of
the mobile operator (i.e., provider) in order to measure the
user’s current location. The techniques used for measur-
ing the location range from the very accurate methods (e.g.,
triangulation) to the least accurate methods (e.g., cell-ID).
The accuracy of the location determined using these meth-
ods is mainly based on the concentration of the base stations
within the network. Therefore, high accuracy is achievable
in the urban areas while less accuracy is possible in the sub-
urbans. The main challenge of this technique, however, is
that the LBS provider needs to work closely with the mobile
provider to install hardware and software within the opera-
tors infrastructure. While on the other side it requires a leg-
islation infrastructure in order to compel the cooperation of
the service provider and safeguard the privacy of the differ-
ent users. Examples of such frameworks include E911 [17]
in the US and E112 [14] in Europe. An illustration of the
LBS flow using this technique is shown in Figure 1.
The Handset-based localization uses the handset itself
in order to determine the user’s location. It requires instal-
lation of software or hardware pieces on the handset in or-
der to make it able to compute the mobile user’s location.
The mainly challenge when using this technique is the re-
quirement of an active cooperation of the mobile subscriber
as well as the software that must be able to handle differ-
ent OS setting and types. Currently, only smart phones are
able to run that software. The used techniques for handset-
based localization also range in accuracy and include signal
strength computation of the home and neighboring cells,
latitude and longitude determination (i.e., when using the
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Figure 2. Flow of LBS using handset-based
localization model
GPS), and others. An illustration of the LBS flow using this
technique is shown in Figure 2.
Finally, the hybrid-based localization, uses both of the
above techniques to determine the mobile user’s location.
While having the advantage of both techniques and provid-
ing the highest accuracy, it also inherits the shortcomings of
both schemes. An example of the hybrid-based localization
is the A-GPS (assisted GPS).
2.2. Low level description
A lower level classification of these techniques is done
according to the used localization technology rather than
the initiator or performer of localization. This classification
is shown in Figure 3 and detailed as follows (further details
on these techniques and others are detailed in [48]):
• Global Positioning System (GPS): uses a global navi-
gation satellite system (GNSS) utilizing more than 24
medium Earth orbit satellites that transmit microwaves
enabling GPS-receivers to determine their location,
speed, direction and times. Other similar systems in-
clude the Russian GLONASS [41], the EU’s Galileo
[13], and the Chinese COMPASS navigation system
(extension BEIDOU [42]).
• Assisted GPS (A-GPS): uses both the network- and
handset-based techniques to determine the user’s lo-
cation. This techniques is mainly used in urban areas.
• Angle of Arrival (AOA): is based on the angle at which
device’s transmitted signal arrive at the based station.
• Time difference of arrival (TDOA): works on deter-
mining time difference and therefore the distance from
each base station to the mobile phone.
• Time of Arrival (ToA): similar to the TDOA but differs
in that the base station uses the absolute time rather
than the difference to compute the distance.
• Observed Time Difference (OTD): is based on the time
difference between sending and receiving user’s signal
and translating the difference into distance.
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Figure 3. Location measuring techniques
• Enhanced OTD - (EOTD): is similar to the TDOA
where the time is measured by mobile device but not
the base station. Accuracy from 50 to 200 meters.
• Cell-ID: Measures the location of the user according to
its nearest mobile cell; cheapest and the least accurate.
Currently used by most LBS providers in Europe.
• Enhanced Cell-ID: with this technique, one can obtain
same accuracy as of the Cell-ID but in rural areas.
3. The Privacy Issue
The need for privacy in the LBS systems is very obvi-
ous and critical. Since the location information of the user
can be used to trace the user’s activities and pattern of life,
it is necessary to keep such information private from possi-
ble adversary. In order to legislate this, several laws, acts,
and directions have been made. All of these laws are not
limited to the LBS but any system that carries private data.
Examples of these acts include (1) Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United States
of America [45], (2) Canadian Personal Information Protec-
tion Act (PIPEDA) in Canada [9], (3) Directive 95/46/EC
on the protection of personal data in the European Union
[15], and (4) ISO/TC 215, a standardization initiative for
general regulations defining private/personal data and us-
ages.
3.1. Architectures Achieving Privacy
There are three different architectures for achieving the
privacy in the LBS. These architectures are classified ac-
cording to the rule of user and existence of third party as
follows:
1. Non-cooperative model: In the model, the user uses
his own capability and knowledge to hide his location
using one of the hiding techniques. These hiding tech-
niques include Pseudonimity, false dummies and land-
mark objects. This model is also known for its sim-
plicity in design and vulnerability to several attacks.
2. Centralized trust third party (TTP) model : This
model relies on using a trust third party for performing
the heavy work in determining the proper technique
for anonymizing the location of the user, requesting the
service with the anonymized location and returning the
result to the user. Though being the most accurate and
achieving the highest privacy level, this model suffers
from being very sophisticated in its design where the
TTP represents a challenging bottleneck.
3. P2P cooperative model: In this model, several users
tries to cooperate and compute their location or hide
their location information in a distributed manner in
order to achieve a proper privacy. In this model, the
cryptographic primitives (such like OT, adaptive OT,
proxy OT, and others) play an important rule in secure
computation. Also certificates can be used for approv-
ing the trustworthiness of the users.
3.2. Related R&D Projects
Several research and developments projects have been
performed or currently running in order to protect the pri-
vacy of individuals users in different networking settings
including the LBS systems. This section summarizes some
of these efforts.
1. Privacy and Identity Management for Europe
(Prime) [38]: This project was supported by the Eu-
ropean commission under the FC6 support grants and
ran from March 2004 to February 2008. Participants
to this projects included 18 R&D institutes and re-
search centers which mainly from or operating in Eu-
rope. Topics covered in this project included access
and policy control, contents and semantics, location
and communication, cryptography in LBS and vehic-
ular networks, trust and reputation management, pro-
tection and anonymity, and anomaly credentials. Re-
sults in this work included several innovative solutions
for some of the existing problems in the above issues,
several prototypes, and initiative for several standard-
izations efforts.
2. PrimeLife:[39] is an extension of the above project
and based on a joint fund from FP7 and ICT run-
ning from March 2008 for 36 months. Participants
in this project include 14 research and developments
institutes from both the industry and academia. Par-
ticipants are mainly from Europe and the main topic
of research concerned with protection and enhancing
privacy of users in next generation Internet environ-
ment services including WEB 2.0, mobile Internet, etc.
Though not directly related to the LBS, the project
dealing with the mobility as an important theme of
the next generation Internet may relate to theme of the
LBS in a way or another.
3. Privacy in Ambient Word (PAW) [36]: This project
is made to answer several questions such like: Is it
in theory possible to protect mobile software against
privacy and security attacks while these programs are
executed at untrustworthy hosts operated by the user
or operated by an unknown user. Also, are conven-
tional cryptographic algorithms applicable in mobile
environments. Several works have introduced in this
directions and mainly focused on theoretical and cryp-
tographic bases. The project ran from 2004 to 2008
(completed).
4. FIDIS network of excellence (FIDIS) [18]: FIDIS
(abbreviation for Future of IDentity in the Informa-
tion Society) is a network 24 European industrial and
academic institute that perform research towards tack-
ling the problems related to the ID management with
concentration on the following sub-areas: identity
management (foundations), interoperability of iden-
tity and identity management systems (IDMS), profil-
ing, forensic implications of IDMS, privacy and legal-
social issues of identity, mobility and identity, ID-theft,
privacy and security, among others. Though this is not
directly related to the LBS and its privacy, the iden-
tity (as a threat of privacy) is a general concept which
apply to several settings include that of LBS.
4. Cryptographic Primitives
The cryptographic direction as a solution for guaran-
teeing privacy in the LBS systems has not been used yet.
Though, a great deal of work have been before on the cryp-
tographic primitives in other networking and technological
settings that are awaiting a practical use in LBS. In the fol-
lowing we detail a set of these primitives that have a strong
and promising relationship with the LBS.
4.1. Blind signature
The blind signature is introduced firstly by David Chaum
[10] and it works as follows: Firstly, the owner of the mes-
sage produces the product of the message and a blinding
factor re as m′ = mre mod N where m′ , the blinded
message, does not reveal any information about the original
message m. Then, the signing authority signs, the message
as follows to reveal s as follows s′ = (m′)d mod N . Af-
ter that, s′ is returned to the author of the message who
can remove the blinding factor performing the following
s = s
′
∗ r−1 mod N . Obviously this works because the
property of the RSA keys satisfying red ≡ r mod N . I.e.,
s ≡ s
′
∗ r−1 ≡ (m
′
)dr−1 ≡ mdredr−1 ≡ mdrr−1 ≡ md
mod N , where the final result is the typical RSA signature.
The applicability of the blind signature to the privacy
is very direct and essential. Assuming cooperative sce-
nario for introducing privacy, any device in the LBS sys-
tem using the blind signature technique still sign a message
from any LBS device without having access to the con-
tents of the message itself (guaranteeing the privacy of its
owner). Extensive work has been performed on blind sig-
natures on the context of e-voting and e-cash among others
[46, 11, 49, 29].
4.2. Oblivious transfer (OT)
The oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is a method used
for secure computing in which the sender sends some in-
formation to the receiver but remains oblivious to what the
receiver has received. [34]. Broadly, the OT protocols are
divided into two main protocol categories which are 1 − 2
OT and 1 − n OT (read as 1 out of 2 and 1 out of n respec-
tively). The 1−2 OT, firstly discussed by Even et al. in [16]
and based on RSA [40] assumes a sender which has m0 and
m1 as messages and receiver that has a bit b. The sender
wants to make sure that the receiver receives one message
only among his messages (mb) and the sender wants to re-
ceive mb but without making the sender knows the bit b
itself. Technically, it works as follows:
1. The sender generates RSA keys, including the mod-
ulus n, the public exponent e, and the private expo-
nent d, and picks two random messages r0 and r1, and
sends n, e, r0, and r1 to the receiver.
2. The receiver picks a random message k, encrypts k,
and adds rb to the encryption of k, modulo n (i.e.,
E(k) + rb mod n), and sends the result q to the
sender.
3. The sender computes k0 to be the decryption of q− r0
and similarly k1 to be the decryption of q − r1, and
sends m0 + k0 and m1 + k1 to the receiver.
4. The receiver knows kb and subtracts this from the cor-
responding part of the sender’s message to obtain mb.
The 1−n OT is a generalization of the the 1−n with the
assumption that the sender has n messages sorted according
to an index i [44]. In that case, the sender want the receiver
to know a single message among the n message while the
receiver is interested in not revealing the index of the mes-
sage i. This is specially important when the scenario is ap-
plied on data retrieval that preserve the privacy of the data.
Other variants of oblivious transfer schemes which applies
for the distributed systems in general and LBS systems in
specific include the following:
• Adaptive OT [32]: This technique differs from the
technique mentioned above in that it can be applied
adaptively and allow multiple execution without re-
vealing any information exchange.
• Dynamic OT [24]: The dynamic OT runs over a dy-
namic database that shrinks and grow according to the
deletion and addition of data from or in it respectively.
• Proxy OT [50]: The proxy OT is very suitable for
devices with limited computation capabilities. That
is, the OT procedure which is known to be computa-
tionally expensive is applied on another device with a
strong computational capability and the final result is
returned to the mobile device in order to be used. This
is critical in our work as most of devices used in the
LBS system are with a limited computational capabil-
ities.
The OT is the building block of the secure multi-party
computation and used heavily in other directions for privacy
preserving technologies in other areas including the privacy
preserving data mining. Scenarios for applications should
exist for applying the OT and SMC both for the privacy
preserving LBS as well. For more details on the distributed
OT and its security issues, please refer to detailed works
such like [5], [33], and [12] (the last work details the k-out-
of-n OT) .
4.3. Broadcast Authentication
The broadcast authentication [37] has received a great
deal of efforts in the cryptographic society along the known
broadcast encryption technique. These efforts are motivated
by the promising applications and great commercial impact
of this technology. On the devices with limited capabilities,
the broadcast authentication have been studied in the con-
text of sensor network and basically based on the authen-
ticating previous messages by delaying the release of their
encryption keys as in TESLA and its variants (cf., [25], [26],
[27], among others).
4.4. Aggregate signatures
The aggregate signature [20] is a digital signature that
supports aggregation. That is, given n signatures on n dis-
tinct messages from n distinct users, it is possible to aggre-
gate all these signatures into a single short signature. This
single signature will convince the verifier that the n users
did indeed sign the n original messages.
The bilinear aggregate signature is an example of the ag-
gregate signature and is based on the short signature which
works as follows:
• Key Generation: In this phase, public and private keys
are generated for the specific users: (a) x ← Zp (pri-
vate key), and (b) v ← gx (public key).
• Signing: given x, message M ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute
h ← H(M) where h ∈ G and σ ← hx, the signa-
ture σ ∈ G.
• Verify: given v,M, σ, compute h ← H(M) and ver-
ify (g, v, h, σ are valid DH tuples. That is, e(h, v) =
e(σ, g). For the left side, e(h, v) = e(h, gx) =
e(h, g)x. For the right side, e(σ, g) = e(hx, g) =
e(h, g)x which holds.
The aggregate signature considers the above short signa-
ture, n different users with n different messages, and two
additional steps which are signature aggregation and aggre-
gate verification. In the BLS aggregate signature for exam-
ple [8], after performing the three steps above on each user’s
message, the user performs the following
• Aggregation: given the signatures σ1, . . . , σn corre-
spond to the messages M1, . . . ,Mn, compute the sig-
nature σ ←
∏n
i=1 σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Aggregate verification: given n different messages
M1, . . .Mn and public keys v1, . . . , vn compute hi ←
H(vi,Mi) and then verify the aggregate signature by
accepting if e(σ, g) =
∏n
i=1 e(hi, vi). The verifica-
tion of this is very straightforward. Take the right
side e(σ, g) = e(
∏n
i=1 h
xi
i , g) =
∏n
i=1 e(h
xi
i , g) =∏n
i=1 e(hi, g)
xi =
∏n
i=1 e(hi, g
xi) =
∏n
i=1 e(hi, vi)
which holds.
For an interesting survey on aggregation signature tech-
niques and schemes with applications, see Boneh’s et al.
work in [7]. Examples of aggregate signatures that fit to the
LBS include works in [6, 31, 28, 4, 30], among others.
4.5. Aggregate MAC
The aggregate message authentication code (aggregate
MAC) [23] is a special kind of message authentication code
that support MAC aggregation. The message authentication
code, known also as keyed hash functions, are a special type
of hash functions which are used for message authentication
and use keys.
An examples of existing MAC algorithms include the
cipher-block chaining MAC (CBC-MAC) which work as
follows: firstly, the sender divides the data x into n-bit block
x1, x2, . . . , xt. Let Ek be the encryption using the algo-
rithm E and the key k, compute the block Ht as follows:
H1 ← Ek(x1), Hi ← Ek(Hi−1 ⊕ xi) where 2 ≤ i ≤ t.
General formulation of CBC-MAC is as follows: let f
be the underlying block cipher algorithm, k be the shared
key among parties, the message x = x1x2 . . . xt then the
MAC is computed as f tk(x) = fk(fk(. . . fk(fk(x1)⊕x2)⊕
xt−1)⊕ xt) [2]. To verify the MAC, the receiver computes
the MAC again over the received message and admits the
message if his computed MAC is equal to the received MAC
from the sender. Otherwise, he reject the received message.
On the other hand, the aggregate MAC adds two
functionalities: MAC aggregation and aggregate veri-
fication [23]. For l different users with l messages
(x(1), . . . , x(l)), after generating the different MAC codes
as fx
(1)
k1
, . . . , fx
(l)
kl
, the aggregate MAC can be constructed
by simply applying the XOR on the result MACs as follows:
f agg = fx
(1)
k1
⊕ fx
(2)
k2
⊕ · · · ⊕ fx
(l)
kl
. The aggregate verifi-
cation is performed as follows: first the receiver computes
fx
(1)
k1
⊕ fx
(2)
k2
⊕ · · · ⊕ fx
(l)
kl
and compare it to the received
f agg. The receiver admits the messages if the result is equal
to received one and reject if it is not equal.
Note that the difference between the aggregate MAC and
aggregate signatures is that aggregate MAC works in the
symmetric key encryption model while the signature works
in the asymmetric key encryption model. This main differ-
ence lead to an overall difference in the operation and veri-
fication methods. Aggregate message authentication codes,
according to Katz et al. [23], greatly reduce the commu-
nication overhead and very applicable to the ad-hoc net-
works. Since the LBS systems include many devices that
are used in the ad-hoc network settings, we expect the ag-
gregate MAC to be used widely in the LBS as well. The
application scenario may include the fact that a single user
would like to authenticate several users at once as the typ-
ical case of cluster formation required for anonymization.
Typically, the MAC aggregation as a mean of message au-
thentication based on symmetric model is more preferred
due to the limited computational resources required for it
over the public key cryptography which is computationally
exhausting.
4.6. Homomorphic Encryption
The homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption
where one can perform a specific algebraic operation on
the plaintext by performing this algebraic operation on the
ciphertext [43]. Homomorphic encryption techniques in-
clude modification of existing non-homomorphic schemes
such like the unpadded RSA, El Gamal, Benaloh, etc. The
most renown scheme is Paillier scheme. Details of how the
homomorphic property is maintained including the follow-
ing schemes.
• Unpadded RSA [40]: Let the public key be m and e,
then the encryption of message x is given by E(x) =
xe mod m which satisfy the following homomorphic
property E(x1)E(x2) = xe1xe2 mod m = (x1x2)e
mod m = E(x1x2 mod m).
• El Gamal [19]: Let the public key be p, g, h = ga, and
a is the secret key, then the encryption of a message
x is E(x) = (gr, x · hr) which satisfies the follow-
ing homomorphic property: E(x1)E(x2) = (gr1 , x1 ·
hr1)(gr2 , x2 · h
r2) = (gr1+r2 , (x1 · x2)h
r1+r2) =
E(x1x2 mod m).
• Goldwasser Micali [21]: Let the public key is the
modulus m and base g, and the encryption of message
E(x) = gxrm mod m2, then we have the following
homomorphic property: E(b1)E(b2) = r21xb1r22xb2 =
(r1r2)
2xb1+b2 = E(b1⊕b2) where⊕ is the exclusive-
or operation.
• Paillier scheme [35]: Let the public key be tge
modulus m and the base g, then the encryption of
a message x is gxur mod m which satisfies the
following homomorphic property: E(x1)E(x2) =
(gr1rm1 )(g
x2rm2 ) = g
x1+x2(r1r2)
m = E(x1 + x2
mod m)
5. Other General Directions
As we mentioned before, the privacy in the LBS is still a
challenging research direction that requires a lot of innova-
tive solutions. In this section, we summarize a set of direc-
tions related to the aforementioned privacy architectures.
5.1. Membership Control
The membership control is an important directions for
obtaining the trustworthiness in a distributed cooperative ar-
chitecture aiming to provide privacy in LBS. Important ele-
ments of the membership control’s research can be concen-
trated on the authentication, authorization and anonymiza-
tion. Though these techniques are heavily studied and re-
search in other settings, it need to be innovatively brought
into the LBS system’s field considering the different users’
and applications’ requirements and specifications.
5.2. Performance Consideration
The performance as an important issue not only in the
LBS but in every system that seeks a commercial impact.
However, in the LBS it is more critical to consider the per-
formance since many platforms used for the LBS are basi-
cally mobile devices with limited resources. That is, related
costs such like the computation, communication, and mem-
ory need to be considered for any successful design. Also,
the privacy need to be considered as borderline when es-
timating the cost. The scalability as well is an important
performance criterium that need to be considered.
5.3. Advancing the Secure Search
Heavy and intensive works have been performed on the
search over encrypted data [1] which is a promising direc-
tion as the LBS requires a retrival for searchable data. How-
ever, since the LBS system mainly uses numerical data as
an input for the location information, we expect the search-
able encryption to be easier than general search encryption’s
case.
5.4. The Theory and Foundations
As a mater of fact, the definition of privacy is disputable
[3]. Not only this but several security models guaranteeing
privacy are, in many cases, not proved to provide privacy
meeting the different definitions. Accordingly concrete pri-
vacy definitions are required. More precisely, research on
the following directions would have fruitful results and im-
pact:
1. Expressing privacy: allow user’s awareness of both
formally defined, and realistically expressible privacy.
2. Support various user’s requirements: express privacy
as a range of user requirements according to the oper-
ation modes reflexing need for the privacy at the time
and location concerned.
3. More rules for the user: by allowing a “user defined”
anonymization, grouping, etc, we can improve the
adaptability of the LBS privacy.
4. Rigid definitions: not only for the defining the privacy
but also for defining the privacy leakage or breach.
That is, mechanisms are required for leakage quantifi-
cation in LBS according to different real life scenarios.
6. Conclusion
Location based services are promising technological di-
rection with several interesting research problems specially
those related to the privacy as the LBSs are directly re-
lated to human information. To guarantee the privacy while
providing a reasonable level of service in LBS, two ap-
proaches are used: cryptographic and non-cryptographic.
Non-cryptographic approaches include cloaking, blurring,
anonymization, among many others. On the other hand, the
cryptographic approaches are not yet investigated though
many cryptographic components studied in other network-
ing settings are awaiting the deployment in the LBS sys-
tems. These cryptographic operations include mechanisms
for secure multi party computation with extensions to the
nature of the LBS’s dynamic data and adversity, group for-
mation (including authentication, signatures, group signa-
tures, aggregate signatures and MAC, among others), and
homomorphic encryption.
This paper introduced a general survey and many works
are to be done. First, we will investigate the applicability
of other SMC protocols and their variations for LBS de-
vices (such like smartphones, PDAs, etc). Second, we will
investigate the different scenario of applications and pri-
vacy breaches resulting from each in order to provide the
proper cryptographic operations to limit or blocking these
breaches.
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